Game theory of academic effort and hiring in the age of AI

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Article Summary

Many academic disciplines (in particular, mathematics and the theoretical sciences) face difficult questions about how to adapt their practices to the rise of highly capable artificial intelligence (AI). Before AI, a well-written research paper with a strong theoretical result acted as a reliable signal that its authors understood their field in depth. Now that AI is widely accessible, such signals have become cheaper to produce. As a result, they no longer reliably sort academics by their level of understanding. This has direct consequences for academic hiring. The age of AI raises a question for each side of the academic job market. Should an early-career researcher invest in a deep understanding of their field, or instead use AI to build a longer resume with many papers? Should a recruiter favor applicants with fewer papers who pass an interview aimed at probing understanding, or insist on both publication volume and a pass? In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of this two-sided dilemma. We classify all pure-strategy equilibria that can arise in this game and use learning simulations to identify the behaviors that populations of applicants and recruiters may learn to adopt. Our analysis provides a framework for reasoning about how academic hiring can adapt to AI and for evaluating practices that preserve the value of deep understanding.

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